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A B S T R A C T
The relentless spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and its penetration into the least
developed, fragile, and conflict-affected countries (LDFCAC) is a certainty. Expansion of the pandemic will
be expedited by factors such as an abundance of at-risk populations, inadequate COVID-19 mitigation
efforts, sheer inability to comply with community mitigation strategies, and constrained national
preparedness. This situation will reduce the benefits achieved through decades of disease control and
health promotion measures, and the economic progress made during periods of global development.
Without interventions, and as soon as international travel and trade resume, reservoirs of COVID-19 and
other vaccine-preventable diseases in LDFCAC will continue ‘feeding’ developed countries with repeated
infection seeds. Assuring LDFCAC equity in access to medical countermeasures, funds to mitigate the
pandemic, and a paradigm change in the global development agenda, similar to the post-World War II
Marshall Plan for Europe, are urgently needed. We argue for a paradigm change in strategy, including a
new global pandemic financing mechanism for COVID-19 and other future pandemics. This approach
should assist LDFCAC in gaining access to and membership of a global interdisciplinary pandemic
taskforce to enable in-country plans to train, leverage, and maintain essential functioning and also to
utilize and enhance surveillance and early detection capabilities. Such a task force will be able to build on
and expand research into the management of pandemics, protect vulnerable populations through
international laws/treaties, and reinforce and align the development agenda to prevent and mitigate
future pandemics. Lifting LDFCAC from COVID-related failure will offer the global community the best
economic dividends of the century.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).
Introduction
The extension of the declaration of coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
by the World Health Organization (WHO) on April 30, 2020,
underscores its continued pandemic spread beyond the initial
epicenters. The transmission dynamics of severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, including the
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high transmission rate (an estimated R0 of between 2 and 3.5),
large numbers of asymptomatic transmitters, and uncertainty
about post-infection immunity, mean that the battle against
COVID-19 will not be won until every country in the world can
mitigate and ultimately control it (Inglesby, 2020; Kirkcaldy et al.,
2020; Miller et al., 2020; Salje et al., 2020; Editorial, 2020). Other
recent diseases of global concern (for example, Ebola) evolved and
remained largely contained in a few developing countries. This
provided the opportunity for developed countries to shield
themselves and support proactive action in the source countries.
COVID-19 took a different path, beginning and spreading mostly in
developed economies. Multiple factors including powerful govern-
ments, resilient and technologically sophisticated economies,
well-established institutions, robust public health and health care
systems, social security infrastructure, low household occupancy,
and public solidarity all helped these early hotspots to embark on
mitigation efforts. Now, COVID-19 has spread to most of the
countries grouped as ‘least developed, fragile, or conflict-affected
countries’ (LDFCAC), where SARS-CoV-2 could establish a strong
footing.
The challenges: immunity confounders, at-risk populations, and limits
of preparedness
There is insufficient evidence to support the assumption that
some factors in LDFCAC might offer protection from SARS-CoV-2
transmission, including ambient hot temperature, humidity, and
open-air ventilation typical for developing country dwellings
(Miller et al., 2020). The reasons for a disproportionate COVID-19
burden in countries with comparable climates, socio-demo-
graphics, and timing of seeding or mitigation efforts are not fully
understood. Comparison of the extensive spread in India, Iran,
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Singapore, with the limited spread in
countries such as Iraq, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar offer no
uniform discernable trends.
Many factors prevalent in LDFCAC limit the population’s ability
to comply with pandemic mitigation measures that are feasible in
developed countries (Ebrahim et al., 2020). These include frequent
handwashing with clean water, physical distancing, and feeding
families during prolonged periods of unemployment. Such
measures cannot be enforced in LDFCAC. The World Bank classifies
47 countries and territories as ‘least developed’, of which 22 are
considered fragile and conflict-affected (Figure 1). An additional 12
countries (not listed as least developed) are conflict-affected.
Of the total 68.5 million forcefully displaced people globally, 40
million are internally displaced and 25 million are refugees. People
in refugee camps face a heightened risk of COVID-19 due to more
densely populated conditions than even the Diamond Princess (24
persons/1000 m2); for example Moria Camp, Greece (204/1000
m2) and Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (40/1000 m2) (McLauglin, 2020).
Given the disruption to health systems during conflicts, surveil-
lance systems may be non-existent in conflict-affected countries
(McLauglin, 2020; Editorial, 2017). When most refugee-host
governments themselves are facing economic challenges and are
unable to achieve adequate support even for their own citizens,
refugees are unlikely to be a priority in host government budgets
for current or future pandemic countermeasures. The sizes of other
ill-defined types of population movements and groupings,
documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees as ‘situations’, are difficult to quantify (Box 1). Some
displaced persons are stateless, a mix of economic migrants and
undocumented refugees, and transient, and are not likely to be
confined to a geographic location, adding to the challenge of
interventions.
Conflict and/or poor development in LDFCAC have led to large
populations of impoverished people living in crowded megacity
slums (>50% of the urban population in 51 LDFCAC), with limited
or no access to clean water (>50% of the population in 38 countries)
and with a significant proportion of the population already facing a
food crisis (in 2019, 135 million people across LDFCAC; >10% of the
population in 24 countries) (Table 1). Open defecation is highly
prevalent in LDFCAC (2017: range 6–75%), raising concerns of
fecal–oral transmission and challenges for surveillance innova-
tions, such as sewage sampling to assess population burden (World
Health Organization, 2020a). The average household occupancy is
nearly double in LDFCAC (>5 persons per household) compared to
developed country COVID-19 hotspots (<3 persons per household)
(UN, 2017). How can social distancing be done in such crowded
circumstances? Who can practice hand hygiene where there is no
water? Furthermore, the perception of the impact of COVID-19 in
Figure 1. Countries designated as least developed and/or fragile and in conflict.
Source:https://data.worldbank.org/region/fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations https://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-
Developed-Countries.aspx.
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LDFCAC populations is likely to be dwarfed by their experience
with other existential threats, such as the daily need to find food
for their families, violence, or even death from conflicts (as in
Afghanistan recently) or diseases with a higher fatality (such as
Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)).
Regarding COVID-19 severity and mortality patterns in LDFCAC,
it remains unclear whether innate immunity achieved through
exposure to other vaccines (such as BCG and polio) may be
beneficial in overriding the role of comorbidities prevalent in
LDFCAC in the spread of COVID-19 in these areas (Hamiel et al.,
2020). The comorbidity burden is high in LDFCAC: 13 countries
have a diabetes prevalence >10% among persons aged 20–79 years,
35 countries have >10 000 tuberculosis patients, and 40 countries
have >10 000 persons living with HIV/AIDS (Table 1). While the
information on the effects of SARS-CoV-2 in children is still
emerging, the finding that SARS-CoV-2 successfully infects human
gut enterocytes is of concern, because of the high burden of
intestinal polyparasitism in all LDFCAC, which poses a serious
threat to millions of children and women of reproductive age
(Viner and Whittaker, 2020; Bradbury et al., 2020). Hookworm
infections exacerbate anemia, which further increases maternal
mortality from peripartum blood loss. Each country faces unique
challenges from being overburdened with one or more of the
existing preventable or treatable infections, such as measles,
tuberculosis, polio, cholera, yellow fever, malaria, meningitis, and
HIV/AIDS. It is unknown whether the high prevalence of the
aforementioned infections and other potential confounders,
including genetic mutations (glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase
(G6PD) deficiency, sickle cell trait) and the prevalence of herpes
simplex virus type 2 (HSV-2) (women, 44%; men 25%, in select
LDFCAC (James et al., 2020)), may directly or inversely impact
COVID-19 progression or severity.
What we do know is that two critical factors that underscore
the exponential spread of COVID-19 – density and/or movement of
the population – are highly relevant to LDFCAC. The low airline
volume and frequency of flights in these countries may have
helped to slow down the initial spread of COVID-19 in LDFCAC.
However, once community seeding and spread begin, the informal
rural–urban transportation modes prevalent in LDFCAC, along with
migration, porous borders, and displacement of people, will be
sufficient to sustain continued community transmission. Even if
the predominantly younger age population in LDFCAC can be a
protective factor in reducing COVID-19 mortality, the concentra-
tion of people living with HIV/AIDS (about two-thirds of the global
total, or 25 million), mostly in the 15–49 years age groups, may
negate such protection. Only about 50% of the people living with
HIV/AIDS in LDFCAC benefit from adequate treatment, as reflected
by their HIV viral load suppression rates (Marsh et al., 2019). The
destruction of road and transport networks in conflict-affected
countries (for example, in DRC only 5% of 58 000 km of roads are
usable) may help to impede COVID-19 expansion deeper to rural
areas. However, the reach of COVID-19 to Amazon Indian tribes
suggests that minimal population contact is sufficient for the
seeding of the highly contagious SARS-CoV-2.
Health systems in LDFCAC are chronically underfunded and
are often sustained largely by international development assis-
tance (World Health Organization, 2020b). Together with low
domestic spending on health (average in 2016, US$23) and
suboptimal infrastructure and economic development, the
majority of LDFCAC score the lowest in pandemic preparedness:
40 countries score below 33 out of 100 (the top score) in the
Global Health Security Index (Table 1). Hospitals in Afghanistan
and other conflict-affected countries are still treating war
casualties, along with COVID-19 cases, and access to personal
protective equipment is limited. In 2016, in Afghanistan,
international financing contributed to 50% of the US$57 per-
capita spending on health (compared to US$5180 in high-income
countries), and the government contribution remained at 5%
(World Health Organization, 2020b). Survival crisis mitigation
efforts in some countries are likely to facilitate community
transmission of COVID-19. For example, in Afghanistan, physical
distancing and face-covering were uncommon among crowds at
the free bread distribution centers.
Consequences of the expansion of COVID-19 in LDFCAC
The impact of mitigation in LDFCAC on general health care
delivery, the redirection of health care resources for the COVID-19
response, and task-shifting will undoubtedly impede ongoing
public health efforts and reverse gains in health indices made in
recent decades (Roberton et al., 2020). The COVID-19 response has
already absorbed response capacities for other diseases, such as for
the Ebola response in the DRC. Testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis have been interrupted in many high HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis burden countries. An estimated 117 million children
in 37 countries may miss out on receiving the measles vaccine as a
result of delays in campaign implementation. During the 2014–
2015 Ebola outbreak, deaths caused by measles, malaria, HIV/AIDS,
and tuberculosis attributable to health system failures exceeded
deaths from Ebola. The WHO issued revised operational guidelines
Box 1. Select population displacement situationsa.
Asylum and migration in West and Central Africa
A mix of refugees alongside people fleeing financial hardship. West and Central Africa is a place of complex mixed movements
inside the region or from the region to other parts of the world, such as Europe, through the Central Mediterranean route.
Stateless in the Great Lakes region
Highlighting statelessness in the 12 Member States.
Stateless in West and Central Africa
At least 700 000 stateless people are in West and Central Africa.
Mediterranean situation
Persecution, conflict, and poverty forced over 1 million people to flee to Europe in 2015. Many came seeking safety for themselves
and their families, risking their lives and facing a treacherous journey.
Western Balkans
Following the de facto closure of the so-called Western Balkans route in March 2016, strict border policies led to the fragmentation
of the mixed flows of migrants and refugees through Southeast Europe, opening new smuggling pathways in parts of the Western
Balkans that had not been affected so far. In addition to the shift in movement patterns, the intensity of migration has also increased
substantially throughout the region. Still, most new arrivals view Southeast Europe as a transit region for their journey to final
destinations in Northern and Western Europe.
ahttps://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations.
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in April 2020 that halted all mass drug administrations for
deworming that benefited close to 600 million in 2017.
While developed countries can boost their economies through
intra- and post-pandemic economic stimulus packages, already
indebted LDFCAC have no such economic leverage. Stalling existing
or continued multi- and bilateral development assistance due to
the inward focus of the usual donor countries or investments in
COVID-19 research, will exacerbate the financial shock that is likely
to linger in COVID-19-affected LDFCAC. The compounded impact
will further stress the already dysfunctional health systems due to
reduced allocations to health and social services with the shrunken
gross domestic product (GDP). Lockdowns without adequate
online options and unemployment could further deteriorate the
food crisis, encourage economic migration, and thereby reverse
Table 1
COVID-19: select predisposing factors and mitigation challenges in the least developed, fragile, and conflict-affected countries and territories.

























Conflicted-affected, fragile, and least developed
Afghanistan 63 9.2 70 000 7200 60 37 (11.3) 21.0
Burkina Faso 66 7.3 9500 96 000 85 6 (1.2) 30.1
Burundi 58 5.1 12 000 82 000 93 2 (0.2) 22.8
Central African
Republic
93 6.0 25 000 110 000 92 41 (1.8)i 27.3
Chad 88 6.0 21 000 120 000 90 4 (0.6) 28.8
Congo, DR 75 6.0 270 000 450 000 91 26 (15.6) 26.5
Eritrea 70 5.1 3100 18 000 81 – 22.4
Gambia 35 1.9 4000 26 000 55 10 (0.2) 34.2
Guinea-Bissau 82 2.4 6800 44 000 68 10 (0.1) 20.0
Haiti 74 6.7 20 000 160 000 93 35 (3.7) 31.5
Kiribati – 22.5 400 – 44 – 19.2
Liberia 66 2.4 15 000 39 000 97 1 (0.4) 35.1
Mali 56 2.4 10 000 150 000 68 3 (0.6) 29.0
Myanmar 41 3.9 181 000 240 000 47 1 (0.7) 43.4
Niger 70 2.4 19 000 36 000 87 7 (1.4) 32.2
Solomon Islands – 19.0 480 – 49 – 20.7
Somalia 74 5.1 39 000 11 000 81 17 (2.1) 16.6
South Sudan 96 10.2 16 000 190 000 98 61 (7.0) 21.7
Sudan 92 22.1 30 000 59 000 62 14 (5.9)i 26.2
Timor-Leste – 6.7 6300 – 50 – 26.0
Tuvalu – 22.1 31 – 3 – 21.6
Yemen 61 5.4 14 000 11 000 51 53 (15.9) 18.5
Fragile and conflicted-affected
Cameroon 38 6.0 47 000 540 000 71 8 (1.4)i 34.4
Congo, Republic of 47 6 20 000 89 000 63 – 23.6
Iraq 47 8.8 16 000 – 29 18 (1.8) 25.8
Kosovo – – – – – – –
Lebanon 53 11.2 750 2500 19 30 (0.4)i 43.1
Marshall Islands – 30.5 250 – 26 – 18.2
Micronesia – 11.9 – – 37 – 32.8
Nigeria 50 3.1 429 000 1 900 000 80 5 (5.0)i 37.8
Papua New Guinea – 17.9 37 000 46 000 81 – 27.8
Syria 19 13.5 3300 <1000 29 36 (6.6) 19.9
Venezuela 32 7.0 13 000 – 21 32 (9.3) 23.0
West Bank, Gaza – 9.5 38 – 20 – –
Zimbabwe 25 1.8 30 000 1 300 000 78 38 (3.6) 38.2
Least developed
Angola 56 9.0 109 000 330 000 77 62 (0.6)i 25.2
Bangladesh 55 9.2 357 000 14 000 23 37 (1.3)i 35.0
Benin 62 1.0 6500 73 000 73 – 28.8
Bhutan 70 10.3 1100 1300 13 – 40.3
Cambodia 55 6.4 49 000 73 000 42 – 39.2
Comoros 70 12.3 290 <200 35 – 27.2
Djibouti 66 5.1 2500 8800 54 – 23.2
Ethiopia 74 4.3 165 000 690 000 84 27 (8.0)i 40.6
Guinea 43 2.4 22 000 120 000 65 3 (0.3) 32.7
Lao 31 6.4 11 000 12 000 32 – 43.1
Lesotho 51 4.5 13 000 340 000 75 30 (0.4)i 30.2
Madagascar 77 4.5 61 000 39 000 76 28 (1.3)i 40.1
Malawi 67 4.5 33 000 1 000 000 84 22 (3.3) 28.0
Mauritania 80 7.1 4100 5600 37 50 (0.6) 27.5
Mozambique 80 3.3 162 000 2 200 000 87 34 (1.7)i 28.1
Nepal 54 7.2 42 000 30 000 39 – 35.1
Rwanda 53 5.1 7300 220 000 87 1 (0.1) 34.2
Sao Tome 87 2.1 260 – 64 – 17.7
Senegal 39 2.4 19 000 42 000 40 3 (0.4) 37.9
Sierra Leone 76 2.4 23 000 70 000 89 4 (0.3) 38.2
Togo 51 2.4 2800 110 000 85 – 32.5
Uganda 54 2.5 86 000 1 4 00 000 94 4 (0.5) 44.3
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previous socio-economic improvements, including in education
and gender equity. Population displacements may propagate other
prevalent or reemerging vaccine-preventable diseases globally.
Even when a vaccine is developed, vaccine-induced immunity
against SARS-CoV-2 is not a given, as the benefits could be partial,
population-dependent, or transient (Editorial, 2020). The finding
that 95% of the population in France and Spain remain susceptible
to the virus does not offer much hope for relying on herd immunity
(Kirkcaldy et al., 2020; Salje et al., 2020; Editorial, 2020). As long as
human mobility cannot be adequately curtailed, circulating SARS-
CoV-2 in LDFCAC will become a permanent threat, and further
outbreaks will be inevitable in all countries.
Is there a way forward?
A successful medical countermeasure for COVID-19 will be in
limited supply, and assuring equitable access and distribution to
LDFCAC is important (Bollyky et al., 2020; Ledford, 2020).
Experience from the dissemination of interventions such as those
for tuberculosis, polio, and HIV/AIDS underscores the inverse
equity hypothesis that public health interventions usually benefit
the well-resourced earlier than the resource-poor, even during
pandemics (Victora et al., 2018; Wade, 2020). Treatment options
have helped developed countries to transform HIV/AIDS into a
controlled and manageable disease, whereas LDFCAC are still
struggling to achieve similar outcomes despite unprecedented
funding. The ongoing European Commission-backed Access to
COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator vaccine initiative is com-
mendable and could be usefully informed by equity considerations
outlined in the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
(WHO, 2020; Polansky et al., 2016). However, for full exploitation
of the benefits of the ACT initiative, a framework and funding for
complementary economic and social redevelopment to avert the
unintended consequences of COVID-19 is crucial (UN, 2020;
Marmot, 2005).
There is an urgent need in LDFCAC for funds to expand testing
and contact-tracing, and when feasible, for the use of proximity-
tracing technology and apps that allow people to self-report
symptoms and confirmed infections. This is the only pathway to
ascertain the burden and address the many unanswered questions
on the natural history of SARS-CoV-2. It is critical to determine
whether the many immunological or disease situations prevalent
in LDFCAC have a role in COVID-19 progression, so that the
country-specific response can be moderated accordingly.
Although the immediate focus of donor nations has been a
national pandemic response, this is a moment for ethical reckoning
and calls for new resolve (Kavanagh et al., 2020; UN, 2020; Thorp,
2020). A different type of pandemic mitigation battle plan is
required in LDFCAC. Given the health, economic, and development
impact of COVID-19, similar to post-World War II events, a globally
agreed and funded framework, platform, and mechanisms are
required to avert the disproportional impact of COVID-19 on
LDFCAC. We propose the following seven-point framework for
action (this is detailed in Appendix 1).
1 A new global pandemic financing mechanism for COVID-19 and
beyond needs to be established. Similar to the Marshall Plan of
1948, aimed at postwar Europe, economic assistance must be
made available to restore the economic infrastructure, public
health systems, and social development required to enable
LDFCAC to overcome the COVID-19 impact. The Marshall Plan
(officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was an
American initiative passed in 1948 for foreign aid to Western
Europe. The United States transferred over $12 billion (equiva-
lent to $130 billion in 2019) in economic recovery programs to
Western European economies after the end of World War II.
Such a structure should also include funding for preparedness
for future pandemics. The emergence of Ebola and monkeypox
virus reminds us that climate change, conflicts, and develop-
ment will continue to increase human proximity to vectors of
unknown viruses. Economic recovery and human development
is beyond the scope of the WHO.
2 A global all-hands pandemic taskforce. Preparedness and the
deliverables for a pandemic response are beyond the remit of
public health systems alone or the WHO and must be
interdisciplinary, crosscutting, and include all elements of
governance and social systems at a global level. An entity that
can provide broader guidelines to all countries and specific
technical assistance to countries in greater need could help unify
the response.
3 A forward-looking country plans to train, leverage, and maintain
essential capabilities. Plans, procedures, and cataloged inventory
are required to fully repurpose existing capacities (disease
control programs, public–private partnerships, religious insti-
tutions) and infrastructure (buildings, supply chains, and
defense personnel) to respond to COVID-19 and future
pandemics. LDFCAC must have access to tests, treatments,
and vaccines as they become available in developed countries.
Table 1 (Continued)

























Tanzania 51 5.7 142 000 1 600 000 81 – 36.4
Vanuatu – 11.9 130 – 50 – 26.1
Zambia 54 4.5 60 000 1 200 000 77 24 (2.3)i 28.7
–, data unavailable. https://data.worldbank.org/region/fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations.
a https://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-Developed-Countries.aspx.
b https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/en.pop.slum.ur.zs, since 2014.
c https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sh.sta.diab.zs, 2019.
d https://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/“TB_burden_countries_2020-04-20”, 2018 data.
e https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/2019-UNAIDS-data_en.pdf, 2019 estimates.
f https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/jmp-2017/en/, 2015 data.
g https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises 2018–2019 data, Criteria for food crisis estimation: households either have food consumption gaps
that are reflected by high or above usual acute malnutrition, or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through
crisis-coping strategies.
h https://www.ghsindex.org/ Global Health Security Index. The perfect score is 100.
i Based on select populations or regions of the country or refugee populations.
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4 Utilize, enhance, and institutionalize surveillance and early
detection capabilities. The 11 core prevention, detection, and
response capacities developed by the Global Health Security
Initiative, complemented by other disease-specific programs,
including the influenza sentinel surveillance systems (Polansky
et al., 2016), could be enhanced to usefully supplement COVID-
19 basic surveillance and monitoring needs. They should be
integral to the country’s plan for a pandemic response.
5 Establish, expand, and sustain research and development readiness.
Country-level epidemiology and statistical capacity are required
to analyze and model trends from local tests and contact-tracing
data and conduct environmental and sero-epidemiological
studies. Bio-repositories and advanced computational capacities
can be shared by a regional group of countries.
6 Inclusion of pandemics in international humanitarian law. The
Geneva Conventions (The International Committee of the Red
Cross, 2020) should be amended to allow for truces during
pandemics so that the pandemic response can be extended to
conflict-affected areas and populations (Editorial, 2017).
7 A renewed development agenda for LDFCAC. A revival of the
WHO Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978 calling for a comprehensive
development plan addressing socio-economic issues.
Existing organizations may be insufficient
Smart management principles would advocate for inclusion. As
such, there are significant roles that all existing organizations
could play. However, none of these organizations were created to
respond to a crisis such as that posed by COVID-19. Overreliance on
the WHO may not help. The WHO is grossly underfunded to
achieve even its fundamental mandate, which is to improve health
and prevent disease (The economist, 2020). Adding economic
recovery to its mandate would not be welcome at this time.
Flagship public initiatives, for example the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFTAM), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance
(GAVI), and the President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR), have collaborated well with the WHO and are
complementary entities. Similarly, the United Nations (UN) created
a peace and security mandate to “save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war”. The UN General Assembly’s increasing
involvement in AIDS and other diseases is paying dividends and
this role should be continued. The task ahead of us may require
renewed organizational dynamics to save us from the scourge of a
pandemic; however a prototype for this does not currently exist.
Conclusions
The collective stewardship of global leaders, the UN, G7, G20,
and the Davos platforms have helped garner momentum for major
global health and development initiatives. The United States
Pandemic Influenza Initiative, steered by President George W. Bush
in 2005, helped formulate the non-pharmaceutical pandemic
interventions that we are using in the COVID-19 response today
(Charatan, 2005). In 2001, the late Kofi Annan, the Secretary-
General of the UN at that time, donated his Philadelphia Liberty
Award of US$100 000 to seed the Global Fund, the largest financing
mechanism ever for health (UN News, 2020). COVID-19 presents
another opportunity to reaffirm such solidarity. True success in
overcoming the global COVID-19 pandemic will only be achieved
by developing global stewardship and mechanisms to mount an
effective response in LDFCAC. COVID-19 has massively disrupted
lives; there have been close to 40 million cases of disease and one
million deaths, and an economic fallout due to poor planning and a
haphazard global response. We must protect and support LFDCAC.
COVID-19 anywhere is COVID-19 everywhere.
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Appendix.
COVID-19 in fragile and least developed countries—time for a
paradigm change in global health
Seven proposed interventions to empower LDFCAC to avert a
COVID-19-related massive reversal of the health and development
trajectory:
1. New global pandemic financing mechanism for COVID-19 and
beyond. COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic, and our
experience of this disease should be used as a prelude to
developing future resilience. Our global community is significantly
more inter-dependent now than after World War II in 1945, when
the UN and the international financing institutions were created.
The progression of COVID-19 across geographical regions has been
temporally and geographically staggered, allowing us to use
lessons learned. A consolidated pandemic funding mechanism for
health, social, and economic development that empowers coun-
tries through local expertise, government stewardship, and
international technical assistance in an inter-dependent partner-
ship, would ensure the maximum benefits. Paradigm changes in
development stewardship could help minimize the skepticism
towards development assistance. Despite DRC’s reputation for
failure, the government, with international assistance, led a
successful national response to its tenth Ebola outbreak. That
country’s recent anti-corruption drives are making progress. A
combination of mechanisms used by the GFTAM and PEPFAR could
serve as models for managing a new global fund for pandemics.
Concerted stewardship by the G7, G20, and public–private meeting
platforms such as the Davos Summit could help. Such a funding
mechanism could be informed by existing technical and policy
leadership from development and health stakeholders, including
the UN and the international financial intuitions. A global all-hands
pandemic taskforce could advise the governance of such a fund.
2. A global all-hands pandemic taskforce. Pandemic mitigation
through non-pharmaceutical interventions is less about public
health and more about public policy. It covers resilience in
essential service delivery, economic stability, food security,
education sector, religious services, and population behavior
beyond the purview of global health experts. Therefore, a global
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pandemic response requires a balanced representation of all
relevant entities that collectively contribute to the functioning of
society. Global public health entities, including the WHO, can and
should continue to play a critical role in analyzing and synthesizing
biomedical epidemiological and public health developments. The
support the WHO is providing through the COVID-19 Solidarity
Fund is commendable, yet such funds do not address the survival
needs of the people. Informed by public health entities, an all-
hands taskforce, with sufficient representation of all sectors, would
be uniquely positioned to propose and monitor a coordinated and
balanced global pandemic response in member countries that
would not only facilitate mitigation measures, but also measures to
avert the adverse effects of mitigation.
3. A forward-looking country’s plans to train, leverage, and
maintain essential capabilities. Along with sufficient funding from
the global COVID-19 Solidarity Fund described above, the global
all-hands pandemic task force could help countries to achieve
essential capabilities. Irrespective of their development status, all
countries have capacities that can be leveraged, repurposed, or
reallocated, including university students, military infrastructure,
religious and community organizations, and large venues such as
schools and university buildings. LDFCAC are not new to infectious
disease threats. They have varying levels of surveillance, laborato-
ry, and field epidemiology capacities that share useful features for a
pandemic response. What many LDFCAC lack is a national
framework for the rapid leveraging of existing resources. For
example, countries with experience of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
Ebola have developed expertise in contact-tracing, laboratory
testing, and national surveys and could rapidly train respective
teams for COVID-19 deployment. Polio-affected countries have
environmental (sewage) sampling experience. Door-to-door vac-
cination assessment and promotion are used in many vaccination
programs and these could easily be deployed to conduct screening
and testing. All countries have universities where volunteers can
be recruited and buildings that can be designated as ad-hoc
treatment or isolation facilities. Religious and philanthropic
entities could complement food and essential commodity distri-
bution if the military can provide logistics and peacekeeping.
Students at medical, pharmacy, nursing, and laboratory schools
could help triage patients or provide supervised treatment.
4. Utilize and enhance surveillance and early detection capabilities.
The Global Health Security Initiative has developed 11 country-
based competencies for outbreak prevention, detection, and
response that could complement the International Health Regu-
lations (IHR). The IHR were used to develop the Joint External
Evaluation (JEE) tool that together with the National Action Plan for
Health Security (NAPHS), both developed by the WHO, is
sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate variations includ-
ing COVID-19. There is an urgent need to achieve and maintain
these competencies and this will require external funding.
Regionalization of some competencies, such as laboratories and
training infrastructure, could help minimize costs.
5. Establish, expand, and sustain research and development
readiness. It is neither cost-effective nor sustainable for each
country to establish biomedical research and development (R&D)
infrastructure, particularly those with small populations. However,
a set of R&D institutions (e.g., biobanks and specimen banks,
advanced laboratories, advanced mathematical and statistical
centers for competence) that serve multiple countries could be
strategically located in different countries in regional collabora-
tion. Basic epidemiology and statistical expertise need to be
maintained in all countries to support epidemiological and clinical
research. They could help analyze and interpret contact-tracing
and testing data, develop warning systems using environmental
samples, and conduct sero-epidemiology studies to fully resolve
population susceptibility profiles for SARS-CoV-2 infection, as well
as refine age- and comorbidity-specific estimates of susceptibility
to infection and infectiousness and severity among symptomatic
persons.
6. Inclusion of pandemics in international humanitarian law.
Given the role of conflicts in pandemics, the first and fourth Geneva
Conventions (the rules of war, or international humanitarian law)
should be updated to mandate a ceasefire during pandemic periods
to enable mitigation efforts both for armed persons and conflict-
affected civilians. The rules of war are a set of international rules
that set out what can and cannot be done during an armed conflict
and have been ratified by all 196 states.
7. A renewed development agenda for LDFCAC. Access to
health care during COVID-19 has renewed the debate on the
principles underlying the 1978 WHO Alma-Ata Declaration that
was later paraphrased in the 1990s as the social determinants of
health. It has become clear that health improvement with
foundational socio-economic development is required to reap
the full and sustainable benefits of modern health interventions.
The gains from a patchwork of sporadic disease-specific
initiatives may not supersede the sequelae of a new threat such
as COVID-19. The economic prosperity brought about by educa-
tion, freedom, and equity will equip countries to withstand such
renewed shocks. COVID-19 requires the global community to
redefine its commitment to achieving equilibrium in health across
all countries.
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